The Effective Use of the Audit Risk Model at the Account Level

Abstract

Auditing standards prescribe a risk-based approach where auditors assess the risk of material misstatement and then design and perform audit procedures to reduce audit risk to an appropriately low level. Prior research suggests that auditors are responsive to high control risk assessments (CRA) but that this response is, perhaps, only partially effective at reducing audit risk, with relatively little insight into where and why this occurs. By refining analyses to more detailed levels of the audit, I extend this research by providing further insight into auditors’ response to high CRA. I examine and find that audit fees are significantly higher for high CRA in revenue relative to high CRA in other accounts, suggesting that auditor effort in response to high CRA is more pronounced in audit areas of particular interest and concern to investors and regulators. Despite this, I find evidence suggesting that revenue is the only audit area examined where auditor effort in response to high CRA does not attenuate the likelihood of misstatement. Finally, because auditors face time constraints, I examine whether increased effort in response to high CRA in certain audit areas diverts auditors’ attention from other areas with lower risk, thus contributing to the overall association between misstatements and internal control deficiencies documented in prior research. I find a greater likelihood of misstatement in non-core operating accounts with lower CRA as audit effort increases in response to high CRA in revenue, consistent with the explanation that high CRA in revenue may divert auditors’ attention from other areas of the audit with lower CRA.