The Effect of Voluntary Disclosure on Firm Risk and Firm Value: Evidence from Management Earnings Forecasts

Abstract

This study investigates whether the voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts is associated with investors' assessment of firm risk and firm value. We find a significant negative relationship between the issuance of management earnings forecasts and a variety of measures of firm risk (idiosyncratic risk, stock return volatility, beta, and bid-ask spreads). Considering specific features of the management earnings forecasts, we find more frequent, more precise and more accurate earnings forecasts are associated with a larger decrease in firm risk. Our results therefore suggest that information quality is an important determinant of both diversifiable risk and nondiversifiable systematic risk. We also demonstrate that management earnings forecasts are positively associated with firm value as captured by Tobin's Q. More frequent, precise and accurate forecasts further enhance valuation premiums. Finally, we partition our sample into good news versus bad news forecasts, and show that the results are driven more by good news forecasts. Overall, releasing high-quality management earnings forecasts is associated with important capital market benefits.