The Effect of United Nations Peace Operations on Post-Civil War Human Rights

Abstract

This paper argues that UN peace operations contribute to a significantly greater improvement in post-civil war human rights practices than would otherwise be the case. The UN has this effect through its ability to reduce both supply and demand side factors that contribute to the decision of government leaders to repress. This argument is demonstrated quantitatively using both the universe of post-Cold War civil wars and a matched subset of these conflicts in which cases are matched along important confounding variables, in effect mimicking random assignment to treatment and control groups. Importantly, this effect does not appear to be the result of selection bias. The countries where the UN intervenes have significantly worse human rights records in the years prior to the end of the most recent civil war than cases where the UN does not intervene. Furthermore, despite having a recent history of worse human rights records, by three years after the end of civil war these countries on average have better human rights practices than non-UN cases. Lastly, this effect holds even when controlling for length of post-civil war peace, meaning that it is not simply an indirect effect of the UN’s ability to reduce the likelihood of civil war reinitiation.