The Effect of the Elected Chief Prosecutor on Punitiveness in Local Courtrooms

Abstract

The United States currently leads the world in the number and proportion of individuals held under correctional supervision. Prosecutors are widely considered to be the most influential actors in the courtroom, and some current reform efforts center around prosecutor-driven reductions in punitiveness. However, little is known about the extent to which elected chief prosecutors impact punitiveness in local courtrooms. This study examines how dismissal and active sentence rates in nine mid- to large-sized prosecutorial districts in North Carolina are influenced by the identity of the elected District Attorney (DA) who was in office when the case was disposed. The study sample included four types of criminal cases (marijuana possession and sale, possession of firearm by felon, larceny, and driving while intoxicated) resolved in the nine districts from 2005–2018. A two-way fixed effects regression analyses showed that elected prosecutors significantly influenced dismissal and active sentence rates in their districts, typically to a small degree (by less than 5%) but sometimes by 20–30%. However, prosecutors did not influence punitiveness consistently across all crime types or according to traditional political party. This study suggests that the elected prosecutor matters in local criminal prosecution and enhances the current understanding of the power of the elected prosecutor to shape punitiveness in local courtrooms.