The Effect of Supreme Court Death Penalty Jurisprudence on the Military Statute of Limitations for Rape

Abstract

In 2018, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) broke from civilian precedent in a case involving death penalty procedure. The underlying issue in the military case United States v. Mangahas was whether abolition of the death penalty also invalidated the statutorily prescribed capital procedures — in particular, the capital exemption from the statute of limitations. Mangahas held that a charge for which the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) statutorily provides the possibility of capital punishment nevertheless does not trigger the capital exemption from the statute of limitations if the death penalty could not constitutionally be imposed. Specifically, the CAAF held that the un-aggravated rape of an adult was subject to the general military five-year statute of limitations, despite statutory language deeming all rape to be “punishable by death” and thus subject to the capital exemption from the statute of limitations. Note that this holding applies only to rape committed prior to 2007, after which amendments to the UCMJ explicitly provide that all rape is exempt from the statute of limitations. As such, Mangahas insulates all yet unreported pre-2007 rape, since the general five-year statute of limitations has now long since tolled. This Comment argues that the Mangahas decision was incorrect both as a matter of statutory interpretation, as evidenced by unanimous federal civilian case law, and as a prudential matter. The capital exemption from the statute of limitations should attach to all pre-2007 rape despite abolition of the death penalty. Part I of this Comment describes the development of the statute of limitations for rape in the UCMJ and introduces intervening Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence. Part II explains how Mangahas contravenes the interpretations of every federal civilian Court of Appeals to have addressed the same issue, and outlines the important military values that Mangahas jeopardizes. Finally, Part III describes how either the CAAF itself or the Supreme Court can mend this conflict.