The effect of stimulus familiarity on the use of criteria and justifications in children's social reasoning

Abstract

Early studies of moral judgement described young children's thought as undifferentiated and oriented toward external features of transgressions. However, more recent evidence suggests that young children distinguish between domains of social transgression and justify moral judgements with reference to the transgression itself, rather than to external features such as rules, authority directives, or sanctions. The present study hypothesized a possible explanation for this discrepancy: that undifferentiated reasoning occurs with the use of unfamiliar stimulus events or stimulus events not clearly differentiated with respect to social domain. Sixty‐one 6‐, 8‐, and 10‐year‐olds were interviewed about four types of social transgression: familiar moral, unfamiliar moral, familiar conventional, and unfamiliar conventional. Assessments were made of several dimensions of judgement hypothesized to be criterial for the differentiation of social domains; responses were also analysed for types of justification used. For familiar stimuli all age groups showed a differentiated understanding of moral and conventional issues, both in judgement and in justification. Younger subjects showed less differentiation in judgement than older subjects when stimuli were unfamiliar. Age differences were also found in the types of justification given, both for familiar and for unfamiliar moral issues. The findings indicate that stimulus familiarity is a more significant factor in the moral reasoning of younger than of older children.