The effect of some dimensions of social power on cooperation in mixed-motive games

Abstract

Two forms of the mixed-motive games were employed to test a game theory model of social power. Power is defined as the ability to control the outcome of the other(s) and the personal outcome. A 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design with repeated measures on all factors was employed in two experiments. The base of power, the power strategy of the other, and all the two-way interaction effects were significant, while the magnitude of power showed no significant effect. Power is not effective in generating cooperation, except in the case of competitive coercive power. Unexercised power is effective only in generating defection or exploitation. Cooperative strategy almost always generates defection under both coercive and reward power. Defective strategy generates defection under reward power and cooperation under coercive power. In order to be effective, power creates inevitable social conflict. If power is distinguished from influence, the study raises serious doubts about the role and effectiveness of social power.