Abstract

Behaviour occurs not as isolated incidents, but within an ongoing sequence of events. The task-switching paradigm provides a useful way to investigate the impact of different events upon subsequent performance. An implication of two-stage task-switching models is that preparing a task without performing it might affect task readiness only to a limited extent. However, recent research has surprisingly shown larger switch costs following preparation (“cue-only” trials) than following performance (“completed” trials). We set out to conduct a rigorous comparison of the size of switch costs following cue-only versus completed trials. In Experiments 1 and 2, we controlled the timing between critical trial events. This had the effect of roughly equating, but not reversing, the relative size of switch costs. In Experiment 3, we restructured the paradigm to equate the predictability of cue and target events. Switch costs following cue-only trials were now smaller than those following completed trials. These studies confirm that task preparation alone is sufficient to drive subsequent switch costs. They also indicate that task performance might increase the size of these costs, consistent with two-stage task-switching models. Switch costs appear to be affected by both the timing and predictability of trial events.

Highlights

  • Behaviour occurs within an ongoing sequence of events rather than as individual, isolated events

  • Increasing preparation interval on the preceding trial significantly decreased switch costs on the current trial. These results indicate that unbalanced cue-cue intervals probably accounted at least partly for the surprisingly large switch costs following cue-only trials seen in previous studies

  • We aimed to assess the following: the presence and relative size of switch costs following completed versus cueonly trials, when measured with a short preparation interval; whether there would be a difference in how rapidly those costs could be overcome with increasing preparation time on the current trial; and whether increasing cue-cue intervals diminish the switch cost

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Summary

Introduction

Behaviour occurs within an ongoing sequence of events rather than as individual, isolated events. It makes sense to study the cognitive control of behaviour in the light of preceding events. Such events will include covert mental processes such as plans and intentions that were not necessarily carried out, as well as our own previous overt behaviour. The relative effects of “knowing” and “doing” have long been of interest in the psychological literature (see the recent review and theoretical model by Brass, Liefooghe, Braem, and De Houwer, 2017), where a number of examples indicate that the impact of what we prepare or intend to do can be relatively weak compared with the impact of what we School of Psychology, University of Aberdeen, William Guild Building, Aberdeen AB24 3FX, Scotland, UK do. Intentions have been shown to exert less of an interference effect upon ongoing behaviour than that produced by actions (Waszak, Wenke, and Brass, 2008). Doing might not always be more powerful than knowing: intended but unperformed actions can prove to be more persistent than those that were executed (Bugg and Scullin, 2013)

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