Abstract
This paper presents quasi-experimental evidence on the effect of order-maintenance policing on both serious and non-serious crime. In 1997, the New York City Police Department engaged in a nine-month ticket-writing slowdown in response to a long and contentious wage contract negotiation. As a result of this labor action, parking, traffic, and criminal summonses fell by 51, 42, and 23 percent respectively. Drawing on several different data sources, I use this exogenous variation in summons-writing to empirically test whether serious and non-serious crimes are deterred by low-level, order maintenance policing. I find that, citywide, complaints for both serious and non-serious crimes increased during the slowdown period. However, a borough-by-borough comparison of crime rates during the slowdown period reveals that the patrol boroughs that participated the most in the ticket-writing slowdown experienced statistically indistinguishable increases in crime when compared to the boroughs that participated the least. These results suggest that order-maintenance policing does not have an effect on either serious crime or on non-serious crime.
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