Abstract
Bulow and Levin (2006) provide a model to explain the equilibrium wage in a centralized matching market such as the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). Their model predicts that the average wages is lower than in any competitive equilibrium. This paper considers an example that incorporates an interview stage into Bulow and Levin (2006)'s framework to study its effect on the equilibrium wages. I find that: (i) the link patterns can influence the intensity of wage competition; (ii) each worker may earn a higher wage than in the firm-optimal competitive equilibrium.
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