Abstract
This study focuses on the effect of inter-group competition in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Recent experimental studies have investigated inter-group competitions in which matched teams compete against each other to produce larger contributions (cooperation within one’s group). Bornstein et al. and Goren (Bornstein [3], Bornstein and Ben-Yossef [2], Bornstein, Erev and Goren [3], Goren [6], Goren and Bornstein [6]) investigate the inter-group competition of a special prisoner’s dilemma. Features of their game fit the examples of lobbying, wars, and similar forms of competition: 1) no contribution is a dominant strategy for all players in the game, 2) no contribution is the collectively (i.e., Pareto) efficient outcome of the game. The studies also show that competition has a positive effect on the cooperative decision, but that the effect does not last when the game is repeated.
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