Abstract
Certificate-of-need (CON) laws currently prohibit entry or expansion of healthcare facilities in 35 states and the District of Columbia. In a lengthy process, medical providers must prove to regulators that their new services and equipment are needed. Medical providers who succeed are effectively guaranteed market power, and thus are able to acquire economic rents. These economic rents create an incentive for medical providers to engage in rent-seeking. Using recent data from Georgia, Michigan, and Virginia, we examine whether political campaign contributions made by medical providers affect the likelihood of their CON proposals being approved. Our results are among the first to consider the effect of campaign contributions on industry regulation.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.