Abstract
Regulators worldwide have recently proposed expanding the auditor’s report in a number of ways, with investors showing particular interest in additional information surrounding management estimates. This study uses an experiment to examine the effects of auditor-provided estimate disclosures on financial statement users’ perceptions of auditor independence, management credibility, reporting quality, and investment decisions. I manipulate auditor agreement with management’s estimates and whether the estimates are incentive-consistent for management. I find that estimate disclosures are value-relevant for users’ investment decisions. Additionally, given an unqualified opinion, users view auditors as more (less) independent when auditors agree (disagree) with management and management as less (more) credible when estimates are incentive consistent (inconsistent). In turn, independence and credibility perceptions influence perceived misstatement probability, financial reporting quality, and investment. The findings empirically support investors’ arguments that auditor disclosures regarding management estimates increase the transparency and value-relevance of the audit report.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.