Abstract
Understanding the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals remains a big challenge. In this paper, we introduce a new update rule in which individuals make decision according to their historical performance in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on a square lattice. Comparing our results with the Prisoner's Dilemma experiment, such an update rule can explain the experiment well, suggesting that this update rule may be useful for understanding the behavior of individuals in the experiment. Importantly, we can use this rule to explain the moody conditional cooperation.
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