Abstract
Men and women negotiate differently, which might create gender inequality in access to resources as well as efficiency losses due to disagreement. We study the role of gender and gender pairing in bilateral bargaining, using a lab-in-the-field experiment in which pairs of participants bargain over the division of a fixed amount of resources. We vary the gender composition of the bargaining pairs as well as the disclosure of the participants' identities. We find gender differences in earnings, agreement and demands, but only when the identities are disclosed. Women in same-gender pairs obtain higher earnings than men and women in mixed-gender pairs. This is the result of the lower likelihood of disagreement among women-only pairs. Women leave more on the bargaining table, conditional on their beliefs, which contributes to the lower disagreement and higher earnings among women-only pairs.
Highlights
Men and women tend to differ in their bargaining behavior
We describe the role of gender and gender pairing in determining individual earnings, pairwise disagreement outcomes, and individual demands
In this study we report on a controlled bargaining experiment in the field and analyze how gender and gender pairing influence bargaining outcomes
Summary
Men and women tend to differ in their bargaining behavior. This has triggered a stream of studies on the link between gender and bargaining in different disciplines of the social sciences (for comprehensive literature reviews, see Kolb 2009, Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri 2019). Most evidence supports that women tend to be disadvantaged, because they are more reluctant to initiate a negotiation Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri (2018) observe that women demand less in a bargaining game in the field, but only when matched with a man. Using an ultimatum game, Eckel and Grossman (2001) observe that men accept more offers from women than from men. Using an ultimatum game, Eckel and Grossman (2001) observe that men accept more offers from women than from men. Solnick (2001), in contrast, finds that both male and female respondents in an ultimatum game choose a higher minimum acceptable offer when matched with a female proposer instead of a male proposer.
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