The Effect of Firm Characteristics on the Disclosure of IAS/IFRS Information: The Cases of Tunisia, France and Canada

Hedi Baazaoui,Mohamed Ali Zaraï

doi:10.15294/ibarj.v3i2.67

Abstract

The effect of firm characteristics on the disclosure of IAS/IFRS information can not be studied in isolation of the national context of the country of nationality or domicile of the firm. Starting from the assumption that the intrinsic characteristics of the firm depend significantly on its size and the country of his nationality, we chose to work on companies belonging to different trading indices and from countries with different cultures and levels of economic development. The selected countries are Tunisia, France and Canada since Tunisia differs from Canada and France mainly by the level of economic development (developing countries) and France differs from Canada by culture. Our sample includes 52 Tunisian companies (40 listed on the first market and 12 on the alternative market), 244 French companies (35 CAC40 Index (top 40 French firms) and 209 CACsmall (index of small Capitalization French firms)) and 223 Canadian companies (36 ^TX60 (first 60 Canadian companies) and 187 ^TX20 Index (Small Capitalization Canadian firms)). Our results showed that the determinants of the disclosure of IAS/IFRS information will vary depending on the nationality of the firm and also showed the importance of the nationality of the firm in explaining disclosed information since the proxy used "country" has significant coefficients.

Highlights

Companies with certain characteristics tend to disclose information even voluntary
We shall present the characteristics of disclosure indices by standard, the characteristics of quantitative and qualitative independent variables, the correlation matrix of independent variables and determinants of disclosure of IAS/IFRS information whether mandatory or voluntary or elementary
We studied the effect of firm characteristics on the disclosure of IAS/IFRS information

Summary

Introduction

Companies with certain characteristics tend to disclose information even voluntary. Other companies are fighting against deliberate disclosure. They seek the possibility to disclose the minimum information. The theory has shown that some mechanisms are behind the policy of disclosure or retention of information. As part of the agency theory, managers disclose information to minimize the costs of monitoring implemented by the shareholders. According to the same theory, indebted companies are motivated to disclose information to their creditors to show that they are trying to act in their interests. As part of the signal theory, any disclosure or withholding information is a signal to business partners and the public in general

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Conclusion