The effect of electronic program applications amidst the politics of administrative burden

Abstract

E-government innovations are known to help reengineer and improve organizational processes in ways that can reduce administrative burden. At the same time, however, research has shown that burdens are often deliberately created and used as a means through which politics play out. We connect these literatures and argue that the positive effect of e-government will likely vary under different political leadership. We examine this argument in the context of the U.S. welfare administration, where federal programs, such as Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), are implemented by the states. Using panel data for all U.S. states, we model the impact of varying adoptions of electronic application portals on program take-up for Medicaid and SNAP. In line with expectations, we find stronger effects of electronic program applications on enrollment under Democratic leadership and weaker effects under Republican leadership, and findings hold across both programs, Medicaid and SNAP.