Abstract

PurposeThis study aims to test empirically the differences between Islamic and conventional banks in terms of impacts of the audit committees' quality on financial performance between Subprime and Corona crises.Design/methodology/approachThe variables are articulated in four hypotheses tested by the GLS analysis. The data were collected via DATASTREAM and from banks' annual reports. The collected data covered four continents: America, Asia, Africa and Europe. The financial performance measures and audit committee's determinants of the conventional and Islamic banks concerned 112 banks of each type after the Subprime crisis and before the Corona crisis (2010–2019).FindingsResults showed that the audit committee reduced the profitability of two bank types. Moreover, it harmed the conventional banks' efficiency, but reported an unclear effect within Islamic banks. Even so, the authors noticed that the audit committee had a positive impact for the conventional banks' liquidity, while the same effect was apparently ambiguous on the Islamic banks' liquidity. For solvency, the audit committee positively influenced conventional banks, while it affected that of Islamic banks.Research limitations/implicationsEmpirically, the authors’ results can serve as a reference for decision-makers allowing to clarify the data on the financial competitiveness of two bank types to facilitate the planning of strategic performance programs based on the audit committee quality. Theoretically, researchers found that the differences between the results are due to the audit committee quality of each bank type or to the financial performance evaluation method. However, there are further factors that are related to the research peculiarities, the methodology, the data and the interpretation.Originality/valueBased on the comparative literature review between conventional and Islamic banks, this study is the first conditional and comparative research between the audit committee quality and the financial performance of conventional and Islamic banks in a specific period (after Subprime and before Corona crises).

Highlights

  • As a mechanism of governance, the audit committee (AC) was defined by the US Financial Security Act (Sarbanes-Oxley) as being “an independent advisory body established by and within the board of directors, primarily responsible for overseeing the accounting process, control the financial information and auditing the financial statements

  • Some highlighted the impact of audit committee quality (ACQ) on the governance quality (Moses et al, 2016; Zalata et al, 2018), while in others, the empirical results agree on the effect of ACs on Financial performance (FP) (Bilal et al, 2018; Aminul et al, 2018)

  • We showed that the good AC’s structure guarantees the supervision of banks’ FPs, and mitigated the agency conflict concerning FP between stakeholders and all types of incoming and outgoing governance flows related to all aspects of financial, accounting, audit and control information, whatever the operational, technical, or behavioral differences between the supervisors and managers may be

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Summary

Introduction

As a mechanism of governance, the audit committee (AC) was defined by the US Financial Security Act (Sarbanes-Oxley) as being “an independent advisory body established by and within the board of directors, primarily responsible for overseeing the accounting process, control the financial information and auditing the financial statements. It is engaged in the services of the board, the remuneration and the control of the auditors’ works.”. Besides that, Vienot (1995) and Bouton (2002) criticized the presence of an AC within companies and confirmed that the AC had no effective activities within the company

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