Abstract
We use a 'multi-player dictator game' (MDG), with 'social information' about the monetary transfer made by a previous dictator to a recipient, to examine whether average contributions as well as the behavioural strategy adopted are affected by the first amount presented (the 'anchor') using a sequential strategy elicitation method. We find that average contributions are positively affected by the anchor. The anchor is also found to influence the behavioural strategy that individuals adopt, such that low anchors significantly increase the likelihood that players will adopt unconditional self-interested strategies, whereas high anchors increase the likelihood of adopting giving strategies. The distribution of strategies-and hence, the distribution of behavioural 'types'-is therefore affected by the initial conditions of play, lending support to the notion that behavioural strategies are context dependent.
Highlights
This paper reports results of an experiment that examines the impact of an initial piece of information—or ‘anchor’—on redistribution choices in response to social information.Anchoring is a well-established cognitive phenomenon describing the tendency of individuals to make judgments that are biased towards the first piece of information they receive [1,2]
Additional pairwise paired t-tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests between mean second movers (SM) responses suggest that there are some significant pairwise differences in SM transfers in response to some first mover (FM) transfers
Ex post tests of the equality of slopes confirm that all the slopes are not significantly different to each other
Summary
This paper reports results of an experiment that examines the impact of an initial piece of information—or ‘anchor’—on redistribution choices in response to social information.Anchoring is a well-established cognitive phenomenon describing the tendency of individuals to make judgments that are biased towards the first piece of information they receive [1,2]. This paper reports results of an experiment that examines the impact of an initial piece of information—or ‘anchor’—on redistribution choices in response to social information. There has been much less research on the effects of anchors on pro-social behaviour, such as cooperation and redistribution, and what little evidence there is, is mixed. (2011) [13] and Luccasen (2012) [14] both fail to find evidence of anchoring effects on cooperation behaviour using public goods games, whereas Fosgaard & Piovesan (2015) [15] find that subjects playing a public goods game with default options (using the strategy method) anchor their subsequent decisions to the default. The evidence is inconclusive with respect to anchoring effects on redistribution behaviour.
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