The Economy of Patronage

Abstract

T HERE is a growing interest in the development of descriptive models of political competition and decision-making. This interest often reflects a dissatisfaction on the part of economists and political scientists with theories of government and public finance which view the state as a selfless, disembodied agent which maximizes a "social welfare function" or simply buys and sells essential public services. In many of these recent models, the key assumption is that government is run by coalitions (political parties) whose leaders act so as to maximize their vote. Anthony Downs, in his theoretical treatment of democracy in terms of an economic model, postulates that the party and the party leaders are motivated by the desire for the power, income, and prestige that accrue to those who gain and hold political office.' Thus, winning and retaining political office is the primary task, and for this maximizing the vote is usually essential. It is "usually" essential because in those cases where there is little popular interest in the outcome, it is often to the advantage of the party to turn out a small vote which is known to be favorable rather than a large vote which may be unpredictable. Strictly speaking, Downs' model calls for the maximization of the probability of winning office rather than votes. But in all important contested elections, maximizing the vote is essential, and it is with such elections that this paper is concerned. Downs' model accounts for a great deal of political activity, but not all. In some cases, particularly at the city or county level, a party will organize, not to defeat its opponents, but to create a "nuisance" value that can be exchanged for pay-offs. Republican politicians in Democratic cities often seek, not to maximize their vote (or even win any vote at all), but to obtain patronage jobs and favors from the Democratic politicians in exchange for not competing vigorously in the general elections. Similarly, certain political organizations have been known to accept electoral defeat rather than win with a slate of candidates that is unacceptable to the party leaders. The party may have had such candidates forced upon it by a demand for "reform" or by a split in the party itself. To win the election with undesirable candidates (for example, candidates who are likely to engage in large-scale political reforms, attempt to create their own machine, or upset established party arrangements) is to jeopardize the party leadership. (To lose with Taft would have been more acceptable, to certain Republican leaders in 1944 and 1948, than to win with Dewey.) Control of the party leadership may be valued over Pyrrhic vicI An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957). See also his later treatment, "Why the Government Budget Is Too Small in a Democracy," World Politics, XII (July, 1960), 54163. I would like to express my appreciation to Anthony Downs for his helpful comments on various drafts of this paper, as well as to Edward C. Banfield, on whose ideas I have drawn freely. I am indebted to the Social Science Research Council for financial support of the research on part of which this paper drew. Responsibilityfor the views herein is, of course, mine.