Abstract
ABSTRACT A model based on a regional property rights framework is specified and lyze the behaviour of regional governments in China. It is able to explain the phenomena, often observed in China, of local protectionism, inefficient output and input mix and tendency towards macroeconomic instability. The analysis suggests that given existing economic institutions, tax instruments on their own are unlikely to be effective in controlling the general level of economic activity and/or influencing the structure of the economy.
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