Abstract
This paper analyses the theory of the optimal output decision for a firm whose policy is to post a non-negotiable price for a good or service in a concentrated market where the demand facing the firm is determined, in part, by a random variable. The theoretical findings are the opposite of those in competitive markets; Proposition 1 states that the optimal output of a risk-averse firm is expected to be larger than that of a risk-neutral firm if the expected payoff of its marginal profit is less than or equal to 1. Proposition 2 states that the optimal output of a risk-seeking firm is expected to be smaller than that of a risk-neutral firm if the expected payoff of its marginal profit is greater than 1.
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