Abstract

Negotiating power remains a key point when it comes to deciding how soon – or if ever, the United Kingdom does decide to “exit” from the European Union. With great uncertainty resulting from the quite unexpected outcome of the 23rd June 2016 Referendum – in addition to the shock of the resignation of the then Prime Minister – and several turbulent weeks which followed in the bid to quickly find a successor in the aftermath of such a shock, it was quite some relief when it appeared that some degree of stability and certainty would be restored to the economy. Several weeks and indeed even months, of uncertainty were however, also anticipated in order for calm to be restored to troubled waters. It was therefore quite surprising when “snap elections” were announced – however, these – just like the announcement of the 2016 Referendum, had been expected to favor the Government. Even though it is widely believed that the United Kingdom will eventually leave the European Union, the outcome of negotiations should surely place it in a better economic position in order to justify its decision to leave? If the opportunity is provided – as its currently appears, for a re-think in “Brexit” to be granted, there is also every possibility that such opportunity might be seized – upon realization that an eventually “bad deal” might be struck. Vital issues and immense legislative changes remain to be addressed during the negotiations process – particularly such pivotal points as sovereignty, the very important role and contribution of the monarchy to the economy – as well as possibilities that Scotland may decide to leave the United Kingdom in the event that a decision is made to leave the European Union. For these very reasons, successful negotiating outcomes will be dependent, amongst other considerations, not only on the ability to retain the role and benefits derived from a very important monarchy, but also in ensuring that the triggering of Article 50 does not leave the United Kingdom as a divided one – without Scotland.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.