The economic origins of paternalism: Some objections

Abstract

In his recent article, Michael Huberman berates Patrick Joyce for 'historical weaknesses' which led to 'serious theoretical limitations' in his analysis and portrayal of nineteenth-century paternalism. It is unfortunate, therefore, that Huberman's attempt to apply a post-war theory of business contract to labour relations in the cotton industry before 1850 is riddled with these very flaws. His central thesis is that there existed an 'accord between workers and firms in urban areas', the result of a favourable labour market for male spinners which enhanced their bargaining power. Competition between employers for a limited pool of reliable skilled labour meant that they 'had to meet workers' demands' for 'fixed or sticky piece-rates, short-hour working, and lay-offs which were inversely related to seniority'. In rural areas the position was reversed. Workers here had little bargaining power because there were few, if any, other employers bidding for their labour and millowners were confident of their ability to retain operatives without having 'to worry about their reputations as good employers'. Variations in piece-rates and the laying off of skilled men in depressions rather than the preservation of jobs through the introduction of short-time were the result. Joyce's emphasis on changes after 1850, therefore, could only apply to a declining number of country mills since economic necessity had already obliged factory masters 'in towns, regardless of the average size of firms', to adopt practices which favoured their employees. Far from being 'paternalists', Joyce's factory masters have been transformed into victims of workers' successful manipulation of a labour shortage.