The Economic Dimension of Soviet Security

Abstract

Most of the literature on the burden of Soviet security concentrates on Soviet defence spending — on the ratio of military expenditures to gross national product (ME/GNP). In this chapter, we will first take a brief but critical look at the current US Government (CIA) estimates of Soviet ME/GNP. It will then be argued that the burden of Soviet security should include, in addition to the burden on defence spending, per se, the costs of other economic-institutional arrangements which are partly or wholly necessitated by the political-military-strategic situation as Soviet leaders perceive it.1 Among these arrangements are: protection of industries which are viewed as important to defence; aid to allies designed to strengthen them militarily and economically as well as to encourage friendship or allegiance; aid to non-aligned nations also aimed at encouraging friendship and allegiance; controls over strategic exports; and so forth. It would hardly be necessary to make a point of these arrangements if all nations experienced them, but they do not — at least not to the same degree. This essay is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive and its estimates of non-military security costs are restricted primarily to those related to attempting to maintain: (1) agricultural self-sufficiency and (2) a cohesive CMEA. Estimates of other such costs by other scholars are also presented.