The Economic Determinants of Political Factionalism: A Case Study of an Indian Rural District

Abstract

There is some evidence to indicate that the factional behavior of political actors in India today corresponds, on the whole, with rational (or calculable) economic interests which may be their own and/or those of their sponsors.1 It is necessary to stress this in view of the oft-repeated assertions that the Indian political equation can be defined largely in terms of ascriptive or personal loyalties or other emotional factors which do not lend themselves to a logical solution. In a study of Congress factionalism in a western Indian state (Maharashtra), it was noted that the pattern of political rivalry appeared to be paralleled by an economic conflict between private economic interests, based largely in the urban areas of Maharashtra (specifically, the BombayPoona industrial complex), and certain agriculturally based economic groups situated in the rural areas of the state. It is clear that, in a conflict of this kind, there must exist a common object of contention as well as an arena where the rival parties engage each other. The larger political sphere, by far, in each of the several states is rural in nature. Hence, our attention in this instance turns to rural Maharashtra. It may be noted parenthetically that among the more important national leaders of India today is Y. B. Chavan, India's home minister and reportedly a supporter of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the current political conflict which has divided the top-level leadership of the Congress party of India. Therefore, we may be especially concerned to examine the