The ecological approach to perceiving as a foundation for understanding the development of knowing in infancy

Abstract

The ecological thesis of direct realism is used as a framework for examining the development of knowing in human infancy. When information for perceiving is defined ecologically (i.e., relative to the situational context and to the physical dimensions, capabilities, and needs of the perceiver), knowing need not be construed as the act of using representations to give meaning to acts or percepts. Knowing, alternatively, is the act of noticing affordances, situation and perceiverspecific meanings of objects, according to their value to the perceiver for achieving specific goals. Changes with development in infant sensorimotor functioning may, in this view, be explained by a process of increasing economy in noticing potentially available affordances, rather than a process of constructing a representational system for making present something not present. Studies of three infant skills widely attributed to the onset of representation are examined with regard to this ecological thesis. Results indicate that the noticing of affordances is critically involved in each of these skills.