The Eclipse of the Difference Between “Subjective Power” and “Capacity of Affectability” in Heidegger’s Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Concept Of Power

Abstract

Heidegger's thesis is well-known: Nietzsche fulfills destiny of by reversing Platonic relationship between essence and appearance. Nietzsche diminishes value of first favor of second. Nietzsche's thought corresponds to last phase of progressive forgetfulness of Being by exposing ultimate possibility of metaphysics. Heidegger seeks to integrate Nietzsche within tradition of historically overlooking question of Being. Like other metaphysical systems that precede it, Nietzsche's philosophy is subordinated to determination of a particular present-athand (vorhanden) entity. For Nietzsche, this theoretical tool corresponds to to (Wille zur Macht) interpreted by Heidegger as an anthropomorphic of domination over beings. This of will to sheds light on what has remained implicit Western philosophy since Plato, namely, desire to violently monopolize ontical totality. Nietzsche is thus not simply a metaphysician among others, but he is last metaphysician, one who exposes the grounding principle of metaphysics while becoming somehow the ideologist of a purely technical relationship with world and truth.1 Heidegger's interpretations of Nietzsche's basic notions (nihilism, superman, values, perspectivism, eternal recurrence, etc.) systematically converge to assimilate Nietzsche's philosophy within of will to power. As tempting as it appears, Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche implies two misunderstandings about concept of power (Macht). First, Nietzschean is not, as Heidegger supposes, a domination over ontical world. This conception of as a repressive authority is for Nietzsche only a particular case of that, furthermore, corresponds to most banal and poorest state of power, to a fundamental impotence. Second, Nietzschean is not an anthropomorphy of grand style.2 Nietzsche never ceases to denounce personal free will while associating human conscience with pure fiction. Nietzschean is not one of domination. It is true that Nietzsche sometimes sees war as indispensable,3 considers that life in its basic functions . . . harms, oppresses, exploits, and destroys,4 associates will with interplay between command and obedience,5 and holds that all events organic world involve overpowering, acquiring mastery.6 But we must add that war continues to be fruit of highly-civilized humanity,7 which is therefore decline, and that life's domination over life doesn't imply any authoritarian eugenics,8 but instead supports weakest beings that do not uphold any imperialist aim or express any metaphysical tendancy for planetary control. search for such a controlling remains purely reactive for Nietzsche. Furthermore, Nietzsche denounces oppression far more than he encourages standardization by a higher power. According to Nietzsche, individuals should not be forced to conform to a predetermined mode of existence; on contrary the exceptions must be saved from mass steamroller.9 This is why Nietzsche's concern for differentiation is incompatible with any form of planetary standardization violently ensuing from a reactive system of pre-existent values. As Eugen Fink writes, a highly evocative passage: The more powerful [machtvoller] a creative life is, more readily it accepts human differences its system of values. . . . And inversely, more powerless and weak a life is, greater its insistence on 'equality' of and its attempts to enmire exceptions its mediocrity.10 Nietzschean (Macht) is not anthropomorphic. This invalidates Heidegger's interpretation that Nietzsche's are inspired by human-type will that encourages man to move beyond confines imposed by his own ontological finiteness order to become lord and possessor of totality of beings. …