The dynamics of federalism, subnational markets and trade policy-making in Canada and the US

Abstract

ABSTRACTPreferential trade agreements are now the dominant trend in the international trading regime. Unlike earlier ‘first generation’ agreements, the new agreements became more comprehensive in their coverage, impinging on areas that are subject to subnational jurisdiction of federal systems. Given constitutionally-prescribed competences allocated to subnational governments, the diversity of interests and sensitivities of subnational entities bring deeply entrenched regulatory practices under scrutiny. Few studies have focused on whether the combination of economic liberalization and political fragmentation will push federal and sub-federal entities to address domestic market fragmentation. We examine whether international market liberalization fosters domestic regulatory and structural reforms to cross-border barriers to trade in Canada and the United States. We show that while the political incentives and functional pressures generated by free trade agreements have fostered attempts at addressing internal market restrictions in Canada, the US has not followed the same path due to weaker mechanisms of intergovernmental coordination.