Abstract

Abstract The missile nonproliferation regime has been criticized for its ineffectiveness in constraining states such as China from contributing to the proliferation of ballistic missile systems and related technologies to states in other regions. This regime is predicated on the assumption that the creation of social norms and acceptable patterns of behaviour will ultimately require China and others to conform to a universal perpective on the sources of and remedies for missile proliferation. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that China's willingness to supply sensitive missile technology is a function of a weapons‐export policy that is incompatible with current initiatives in missile nonproliferation. Such a policy is the product of certain foreign policy considerations and domestic factors that serve as motivational elements within the internal political system.

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.