Abstract

We investigate the dynamics of individual pro-social behavior over time. The dynamics are tested by running the same experiment with the same subjects at several points in time. To exclude learning and reputation building, we employ non-strategic decision tasks and a sequential prisoners-dilemma as a control treatment. In the first wave, pro-social concerns explain a high share of individual decisions. Pro-social decisions decrease over time, however. In the final wave, most decisions can be accounted for by assuming pure selfishness. Stable behavior in the sense that subjects stick to their decisions over time is observed predominantly for purely selfish subjects. We offer two explanation for our results: diminishing experimenter demand effects and moral self-licensing.

Highlights

  • The investigation of social or “other-regarding” behavior has been a major topic of experimental economics during the last three decades

  • What do the dynamics of social behavior look like if these considerations are excluded? Are there any other influences that cause social behavior to change over time? there exists a large body of literature on social behavior, these questions have rarely been addressed before

  • We investigate the dynamics of social behavior in a laboratory environment typically used to obtain evidence on the existence of social behavior

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Summary

Introduction

The investigation of social or “other-regarding” behavior has been a major topic of experimental economics during the last three decades. The authors conclude that “When individuals are not completely certain about what is the right behavior in a particular context, they may regard others' choices in similar situations as sources of useful information.” (p262) In their experiments on delegation, [18] include a baseline treatment in which subjects played a dictator game 12 times. In order to investigate the dynamics of pro-social behavior, we primarily use modified dictator games because these games offer two advantages. They do not leave any room for strategic considerations and can be used to directly observe dictators’ pro-social concerns.

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