The Duplicity of the Theoretical: On Heidegger’s First Freiburg Lectures

Abstract

AbstractAt first sight, “theory” does not seem to be a major issue in Heidegger’s thought. Yet, as his early Freiburg lectures from 1919 demonstrate, Heidegger’s development of a phenomenological method of his own required a systematic debate with the neo-Kantians and the philosophical privilege they accorded to theoretization. While laying the foundation for a phenomenological method whose prime object is the lived experience of the surrounding world, Heidegger sketches out a double concept of theorization, one which, through a process of successive stages of un-living, culminates in the objectified conception of an empty “something,” and another concept of theoretization for which the “something” is “the experienceable in general,” and which guides the a-theoretical encounter of phenomenology as an “archontic form of life” with the world, the other, and the “not yet.”