The Drago Doctrine in International Law and Politics

Abstract

Legal principles like any others, are more clearly understood when one is acquainted with the circumstances, events, or conditions out of which they arise. This is especially true of the Drago Doctrine, the significance of which can be well understood only in the light of the conditions giving rise to it. It is generally known that the country of Venezuela experienced during the closing years of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century, many revolts, civil wars, revolutions, and instances of mob violence, in which natives and foreigners alike suffered many hardships. Various Venezuelan governments repudiated the acts of previous administrations whenever it was possible and served their interests to do so. Finally in 1902, the government established by General Castro refused to settle any claims held against Venezuela or its people by England, Germany, or Italy. It not only refused to adjust the claims of these nations but became rather defiant toward their diplomatic communications and representatives.' When these powers proposed arbitration in the summer of 1902, Venezuela agreed to such a plan only on condition that a commission composed exclusively of Venezuelans be set up to settle the claims.2 This scheme, of course, was rejected by the claimant powers. The controversy finally came to a head in December, 1902, when Great Britain and Germany, diplomatically supported by Italy, established a warlike blockade of the principal ports of Venezuela.3 These measures of coercion quickly brought Venezuela to terms, and plans for the settlement of most of the claims by arbitration were arranged by the end of December, 1902.