The downside of blockholder exit threats: Increasing excess cash holdings

Abstract

AbstractThis study examines the impact of blockholder exit threats on excess cash holdings following China's split‐share structural reform. Previous studies have confirmed the governance role of blockholder exit threats, but their effectiveness is limited to companies with greater private benefits. Using a sample of 2340 firm‐year observations of Chinese listed firms between 2002 and 2009, we find that the exit threat of blockholders increases the level of excess cash holdings. These results suggest that blockholders view exit threats as a means of collaborating with controlling shareholders to boost excess cash holdings and diversify corporate resources for private benefits. The collusion effect is more pronounced in firms with poorer investor protections, lower shareholding concentrations, and more severe agency conflicts. Additionally, in terms of economic consequences, blockholder exit threats decrease buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns and increase the occurrence of corporate scandals. Overall, this study provides empirical evidence of collusion among large shareholders, which harms small shareholders' interests from the perspective of excess cash holdings.