The Dogma of Necessity: Royce on Nature and Scientific Law

Abstract

the philosophical ramifications of modern science—physical, biological, and formal and mathematical—figure centrally in Royce’s philosophy. Even the most cursory of glances at his corpus reveals a systematic and deep engagement with many of the leading developments in nineteenth-century science, from the nebular hypothesis, or evolution in both its Darwinian and Spencerian forms, to the work of Cantor and Dedekind. It would perhaps not be going too far to suggest that, from his first to last writings, the development of Royce’s philosophy is in no small measure driven by an attempt to come to terms with these developments. And yet, while this has received some attention from the scholarly community, it remains an underemphasized facet of his thought.1 In this paper, I want to begin to redress this deficiency by focusing on but one small part of Royce’s philosophy of nature, namely, his views on scientific laws. In particular, I will look at what Royce dubs the “Dogma of Necessity,” the ways in which this dogma differs from his own approach to the natural world, and some possible objections to which his position is open. Royce’s indebtedness to Peirce in logic and semiotics is well documented in the ever-growing body of Royce scholarship. Consequently, it will come as no surprise that he borrows heavily from Peirce, both in his understanding of the Dogma of Necessity, as well as in his proposed alternative. Because of this, I will be making references to Peirce throughout the paper, but primarily for purposes of casting light on Royce’s philosophy, not as an exercise in Peirce scholarship. Even so, one the recurring leitmotifs of this article will be Royce’s ongoing engagement with Peirce.