Abstract

The aim of the article is to present some of the differences and similari- ties in various versions of the double effect principle (DDE or PDE). The following formulations will be analyzed: that of Thomas Aquinas and two contemporary ap- proaches, namely those of Mangan and Boyle. It will be shown that the presented modern versions vary significantly and the distinction between their intended and only predicted effects is far from clear. As a result, the different contemporary for- mulations of DDE lead to contradictory conclusions, with some justifying what the others condemn. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that, unlike Aquinas, contem- porary authors mostly concentrate on unintentionality condition while neglecting the proportionality requirement. So, unlike Aquinas, they only take into account a narrow scope of cases, where the evil effect occurs with certainty, which leads to a complicated and intricate hypothetical intention test like Donagan’s. It will be shown that, besides its theoretical indistinctness, DDE lead to serious pragmatic risks. It can be quite easily misused as a kind of psychological mechanism to protect self-esteem from a sense of guilt since wrong-doing is treated as merely a predicted unintended effect.

Highlights

  • Nowadays, the doctrine or principle of double effect (DDE or PDE) serves to analyze and evaluate actions with many consequences, some of which qualify as right from a moral point of view, while others qualify as wrong

  • It should be noted that this test is a tool to clarify the differences between anticipated and intended effects. It was constructed for the purpose of formulating the double effect principle proposed by Boyle, and both versions presented by this author remain insensitive to differences in the moral evaluation of both a hysterectomy and a craniotomy

  • According to Marquis, the second version of the double effect principle proposed by Boyle makes the entity responsible for only-predicted consequences, this is a lesser liability than that incurred by the intended effects

Read more

Summary

Introduction

The doctrine or principle of double effect (DDE or PDE) serves to analyze and evaluate actions with many consequences, some of which qualify as right from a moral point of view, while others qualify as wrong. It should be noted that this test is a tool to clarify the differences between anticipated and intended effects It was constructed for the purpose of formulating the double effect principle proposed by Boyle, and both versions presented by this author (at least, as long as the means taken are interpreted as certain activities) remain insensitive to differences in the moral evaluation of both a hysterectomy and a craniotomy. According to Marquis, the second version of the double effect principle proposed by Boyle makes the entity responsible for only-predicted consequences, this is a lesser liability than that incurred by the intended effects If this is the case, the formulation clearly differs from the intention of Aquinas, who explicitly states that no responsibility is assumed for effects that are only anticipated. These considerations, refer to a different ethical principle, defined as the doctrine of doing and allowing

Conclusions
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call