Abstract
Pursuant to Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, executive power is vested in the President of the Republic of Poland and the Council of Ministers. Implemented in Poland, the dualism of the executive branch creates a problem with the division of duties and competence between the cabinet and the head of state. This paper analyses the division of powers within the executive branch in the areas of state security and foreign policy. The analysis of the constitutional provisions and the political practice indicates that the model of cooperation between the President and the cabinet as adopted in the Constitution of 1997 is ineffective and leads to political conflicts. In view of the Polish political conditions, it is advisable to amend the Constitution in order to move away from the mixed model towards either the presidential model or the parliamentary-cabinet model of the executive branch of government.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
