Abstract

Modern dual-use export controls have been established after World War II by using domestic trade regulations to accomplish national security and non-proliferation goals. Nation states executing dual-use export control do so by allocating liability to exporters of the outbound products and set a list-based standard that would prohibit military and dual-use goods and technology from being exported. The exporter-based liability framework and list-based standards by which nation states implement export controls have been followed by countries with export control regimes. However, the increased use of cyber and cloud services technologies have made it necessary to reanalyze the methods of accomplishing the policy goals of export control as there is a shift to address the export control issues of intangible technology transfers. This paper argues that the way the dual-use export control regulation was amended in the United States in 2016 and the current proposed regulatory changes in EU for dual-use technology export control creates potential rifts in the consistency of regulatory standards in regards to cross-border technology transfers, and such differences might would create challenges for the overall pursuit of the non-proliferation of military-used technology. The impact that a divergence in the structures of the current export control regime would not only be impactful to the United States and EU, but also with their international trading partners.

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