Abstract
While much research has been devoted to the institutional determinants of corruption in democracies, debates continue regarding the merits of distributing executive power horizontally (presidentialism vs. parliamentarism) and vertically (federalism vs. unitarism). Taking advantage of the rich empirical literature on the subject, we investigate the effects of institutional features on corruption applying a meta-analytical framework to over 1000 estimates across 71 studies conducted over three decades. Results show a consistent positive association between presidentialism and corruption and that much of the confusion around decentralization can be explained by the distinction between its fiscal and political forms; political decentralization has a marginal positive association, while fiscal decentralization has a negative effect. A series of moderator analyses reveal the sensitivity of many of these findings to research design choices made in conducting the studies, such as the temporal and spatial coverage of the sample and the selection of co-parameters in statistical tests.
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