Abstract
In this paper I examine the particular question of the meaning of the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values in the natural sciences and, if this would make sense, the possibility to transcend this distinction. I claim that the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values maintains its necessity as long as a certain sort of unity between the theoretical and the practical sides of the scientific endeavour has not been achieved. The distinction in question would cease to have meaning only from the perspective of such a unity, since in this manner the normative dimension of science would become an internal term for its historical construction.
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