The Distinct Nature of “Biblical Law”

Abstract

This chapter concludes that “biblical law” is indeed distinct, but not for the reasons that certain intellectuals of the early 1900s advanced. It is unique because it is neither rooted in old law collections nor composed with the aim of producing an Israelite/Judahite expression of the genre. It is unique because its building blocks are rooted in legal-pedagogical exercises. And it is unique because even though its final contributors cast it as “law,” these scribes were more interested in the application of law to the sphere of worship and ethics than in the intricacies of law itself. Contrary to popular belief, then, it is not that the Israelites/Judahites merely attributed their laws to Yahweh while the Mesopotamians credited kings with the collections. Rather, the Israelites/Judahites never had law collections in the first place. With respect to Exodus 21–22, scribes repurposed an old legal exercise on damages, framing it at the front and back ends with non-legal content. As for Deuteronomy, the scribes’ contribution was even more pronounced, in that they produced new “laws,” leaving the impression that part of Deuteronomy 19–25 was rooted in an old law collection. When we examine what we call “biblical law” in the context of Mesopotamian legal-pedagogical texts, it becomes clear that its longstanding placement among the Babylonian, Assyrian, and Hittite law collections is inapt. In recognizing the practical roots of “biblical law,” we can begin to reconstruct both the impetus for its emergence and the uniqueness of its trajectory.