Abstract
This article argues that military integration served a critical purpose in 2006, arguably preventing large-scale conflict within South Sudan and ensuring a level of stability prior to the CPA-mandated referendum on self-determination in 2011. Nonetheless, integration was poorly-conceived and implemented, and received limited support from third party actors that were more focused on rightsizing the SPLA and transforming it into a conventional, professional military. The de facto open-door nature of South Sudan’s integration process created incentives for armed rebellion, while failed rightsizing initiatives increased pressure on the military integration process as the most expedient way of mitigating the threat these groups posed to stability. Integration thus became an end in and of itself rather than a transitional measure to contain former combatants while the government worked out a more long-term solution for South Sudan’s security sector. Consequently, the SPLA was in a state of arrested development, preventing efforts to transform the military from gaining traction, and making the force more likely to fragment along factional lines during periods of heightened political competition.
Highlights
Introduction1 Since its inception in 1983, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) had been integrating other rebel groups operating in what was southern Sudan during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005)
Military integration in South Sudan was not a standardized process; there was no clear strategy or guidelines for how armed groups should be integrated.3. This may have been attributed to the fact that between 2006 and 2013, South Sudan faced concurrent and competing imperatives in its governance, economic, and security sectors, and arguably had limited bandwidth to design and implement a military integration process that would address the threat posed by armed groups
While the donor community had pushed the concept of military integration between the North and South in terms of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), South Sudan’s status as an autonomous and not yet independent region prior to 2011 made it awkward for international donors to get involved in the SPLA’s military integration process – lest they be accused of implicitly supporting the dismemberment of Sudan
Summary
Introduction Since its inception in 1983, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) had been integrating other rebel groups operating in what was southern Sudan during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005). By the time the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed ending the war with the Government of Sudan, over 50,000 men were members of up to 50 armed groups that included rivals to the SPLA, which came to comprise the military of South Sudan (Young 2006; ICG 2006). Military integration in South Sudan was not a standardized process; there was no clear strategy or guidelines for how armed groups should be integrated.3 This may have been attributed to the fact that between 2006 and 2013, South Sudan faced concurrent and competing imperatives in its governance, economic, and security sectors, and arguably had limited bandwidth to design and implement a military integration process that would address the threat posed by armed groups.
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