The Discussion Between Leibniz and Newton on the Concept of Science

Abstract

Our investigation of Newton’s dynamics has shown that his proof of the existence of absolute space rested on the presupposition that the system of the world consists of equal particles whose essential properties belong to them independently of the existence of the world-system. Our investigation of Leibniz’s dynamics has shown that Leibniz did not share Newton’s presupposition and that his dynamics does not need the concept of absolute space. Both investigations dealt with an area which is now called ‘physics’. Newton’s Principia also contains deliberations on the relationship between God and absolute space. These remarks have ever since their publication been the subject of much interest, which, however, has been directed at Newton the ‘metaphysician’ and not the ‘physicist’. In this chapter we shall see that a physical problem lies at the bottom of this metaphysics, although Newton’s metaphysics of space does not necessarily follow from his physics. From the connection between Newton’s method in physics discussed above and his ‘metaphysical’ deliberations a concept of ‘science’ arises which takes on central importance in the discussion with Leibniz. First of all, however, we should examine Newton’s reasons for believing that deliberations on God belong in a work on physics.