Abstract
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 constituted a direct challenge to the coherence of France's long‐standing Gaullist politique arabe. This was based on three fundamentals: an independent position, a special friendship with the Arab world, and an active presence in the region. Faced with a choice between an engaged presence ‐participation in a US‐led multinational force (MNF) ‐ and independence from the United States, the French government opted for the former in the belief that an active role in the region took precedence. To offset the risks of cooperating with the United States in MNF I, France followed a policy of differentiation which included an aggressively independent diplomatic agenda and a well‐publicized distance from numerous US policies. The success of MNF I, however, was not repeated by MNF II as the French government departed from its differentiation and became entangled in an increasingly untenable enforcement mission. The result was a major policy disaster for France.
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