The Dilemmas of Military Withdrawal from Politics: Some Considerations from Tropical Africa

Abstract

Few people consider the armed forces hesitant in their actions. Speed, decisiveness, efficiency, directness—such are characteristics often attributed to the military. Especially in areas where protection of military autonomy is concerned, quick action may be taken. Recent African history suggests that members of the armed forces exhibit willingness to leap into active political involvement when challenges arise to their corporate interest. Since June 1965 fifteen African states have experienced coups d'etat. The decisive act of intervention, however, rarely is mirrored by an equally decisive act of withdrawal. Coups are clear-cut events, transitions to civilian governments far less dramatic or marked. As the time to return to the barracks approaches, doubts and hesitations seem to grow. Officers pause, uncertain whether they have accomplished what their intervention allegedly was to correct. They are caught in a dilemma, and as S. E. Finer noted, “whether their rule be indirect of whether it be direct, they cannot withdraw from rulership nor can they fully legitimize it. They can neither stay nor go” (1962, p. 243). Once military intervention has occurred, voluntary disengagement of the armed forces from direct political involvement comes when withdrawal seems to enhance the military's corporate interest. Splits within the military, relatively restricted objectives, and the opportunity to transfer control to civilians whose outlooks, policies, and backgrounds resemble those of the ruling military group facilitate disengagement.