The Differential Electoral Returns to Local Public Good Provision

Abstract

In this paper, using the locations of the grocery stores of a local food subsidy program and exploiting the variation in voters' geographical distances from these grocery stores, I first document the causal effect of this program on voting behavior. I then focus on the distinct mechanisms that drive these electoral returns by providing evidence for the vote- and often neglected turnout-buying channels, and investigate how partisanship conditions the working of these channels. Finally, I explore how the local spatial distribution of partisan groups in the geographical catchment areas of the program may influence the electoral returns within these localities. The findings of this study indicate that even short-lived subsidy programs that do not provide meaningful remedies to persistent economic hardships can reduce voters' willingness to hold incumbents accountable. On a more positive note, however, the findings also point out that incumbent politicians may still electorally benefit when delivering public service to opposition voters instead of engaging in clientelistic allocations.