Abstract

Two scholarly traditions have developed on the subject of meaningful work: one originating in philosophy, the other in the organizational sciences. These two traditions make divergent and conflicting assumptions about the nature of meaningful work. As more scholarship seeks to bridge these traditions, the fundamentally different assumptions they make about the central construct of meaningful work risk leading to scholarly confusion. In this paper, I clarify the foundational assumptions of the two traditions and argue that each captures an important construct that is separate from, though closely related to, meaningful work. The philosophical tradition is concerned with ethical work: work that is socially valuable and that enables workers to exercise autonomy and dignity in the workplace. The psychological tradition is concerned with eudaimonic work: work that workers perceive as meaningful, with deep personal significance and positive meaning for the individual. Drawing insights from both literatures, I develop and defend a new account of meaningful work: someone’s work is meaningful when they are committed specifically to their own participation in their work. Finally, I discuss the implications of this account for both workers and organizations.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call