Abstract
ABSTRACTThis article introduces a configurative theory to explain military reactions to nonviolent mass protests in dictatorships. An empirical analysis of three cases of such “dictators endgames” (Burma in 1988, Sudan in 1985, and East Germany in 1989), shows that militaries will defend the dictator against the masses if the military leadership’s physical and economic well-being is linked to the dictator’s survival in office. In turn, military leaders will defect from the regime incumbent only if the alternatives of siding with the opposition or staging a coup d’état is expected to be more beneficial to their interests than staying loyal to the regime.
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