The Dichotomy of Politics and Corruption in a Neopatrimonial State: Evidence from Sierra Leone, 1968-1993

Abstract

The scholarly studies on political corruption in Africa are not conclusive, given the lack of knowledge of how neopatrimonialism contributes to state corruption. This is an important omission. There are obvious relationships between regime types and the likelihood, nature, and extent of political corruption.' The analysis of political corruption in Sierra Leone has important implications for our understanding of the relationship between neopatrimonialism and state corruption. Kpundeh indicates that administrative corruption in Sierra Leone was a common phenomenon during the All People's Congress (henceforth APC) tenure.2 Several corruption cases with national political ramifications were common during APC's tenure. Kpundeh provides evidence regarding several major corruption scandals that were unearthed during APC's tenure.3 He indicates that in 1982 the first major corruption scandal referred to as "Vouchergate" was unearthed; "Squandergate" in 1984 and "Milliongate" in 1987 were to follow. The proliferation of national corruption scandals was a distinguishable feature of the Siaka Stevens era. Riley concurs by indicating that Stevens's tenure as Head of State was characterized by continued corruption scandals of the late 1970s and early 1980s.4 The pervasiveness of corruption was directed mainly by the desires of politicians to enhance their personal wealth. Caiden maintains that anytime high level party officials are extremely corrupt, the personalization of the public treasury was inevitable.5 The personalization of state wealth occurred alongside the expansion of the state, particularly as the state progressively expanded its economic transactions. Luke and Riley point out that the majority of African states showed high rates of growth of public consumption during the 1960s and 1970s.6This expansion in public consumption provided ample resources for a corrupt political elite. This group was able to divert and transform public resources to become private wealth. The illegal creation of wealth by political elites is a manifestation of politics in a neopatrimonial state. In Sierra Leone, the expansion of the state sector, particularly the parastatal sector, provided rich fodder for corrupt party and government officials.7 One notices that the state was both a provider and a customer for a wealthy APC clique at the top of Sierra Leonean society. The APC, under Siaka Stevens and Joseph Saidu Momoh radically transformed state corruption. It was transformed from a simple chaotic activity to a well organized systemic activity: an activity where contracts were being rigged, decisions bought and sold, elections corrupted, and political rivals threatened and physically coerced. In some sense, during APC's tenure, state corruption became coherent and orderly. The longevity of APC rule (24 years) provided ample oppor u ity for the establishment of an institutional appara us condoning acts of state corruption. Individuals and groups that were organized made private and profiteering demands on the government. National leadership controlled state access; they had the ability to provide opportunities in o the world of state-owned wealth, and also the power to erect obstacles to those who sought private wealth.8 As a result, the entire political class relied on dubious business transactions to keep a hold on power for more than two decades. Personal gain from politics and public office was a centerpiece ideology of the APC. The concept of real public service, nationalist politicians, and not-for-profit politics were missing ingredients in the politics of post-independence Sierra Leone. During this period, it became the mle for party officials and political appointees to dedicatedly involve themselves in illegal personal enrichment. Top level officials of parastatals left offices under strong suspicion as evidence surfaced indicating that they enriched themselves considerably in office.9 The military government's investigations reveal that the APC tenure transformed the state into a neopatrimonial state: a state were the general rule was organized corruption. State corruption created an environment inimical to economic development. Efficient management had its price and it was not worth much, corruption had its gains and it was profitable; these dynamics added to the subtle, but strong, barriers to political and economic development. These barriers could not be negotiated by the citizenry or officials of international financial institutions. Despite increased realities, the political class was never short of local currency, foreign exchange and luxury goods. During APC's tenure, access to state wealth was a common way to seal loyalty and shore up alliances. Patrimonial relations were clearly a necessary item for state access and the subsequent personalization of state wealth.