The Diary and Despatches of a Military Attaché in Warsaw 1938-1939 by Edward Roland Sword Elizabeth Turnbull Andrzej Suchcits (review)

Abstract

366 SEER, 8I, 2, 2003 Because she has worked in the archives of the Academy of Sciences, and has also looked in detail at three specificprojects involving the image of Ivan IV (V. I. Kostelyev's multi-volume novel, IvanGroznyi, A. N. Tolstoi'splay of the sametitle,and SergeiEizenshtein'sfilm),Perrieisableto showhow representations of Ivan'simage, and of the main achievementsof his reign,were debated at several levels. The immediate needs of Stalinistpropaganda, for example duringthe annexation of the Balticrepublics,are reflectedin artisticpriorities (theemphasison Ivan'sBalticcampaignswas a featureof Kostelyev'swork,for instance). The depiction of Ivan's mental turmoil in Eizenshtein'sfilm, more famously,angered Stalinso much that he intervenedpersonallyin the process of its censorship. But Perriearguesthat the original impetus to recreate Tsar Ivan IV involved no detailed blueprintsfrom the Kremlin. Instead, following broad general guidelines that encouraged patriotic explorations of national heroes, individual writers assumed the task of creating a new Ivan for themselves,with mixed and occasionallyunsuccessfulresults. Perriemakesit clearthatby the time of Stalin'sdeath the image of Ivan had come to stand for Stalin in the minds of many Soviet writers. To praise the Tsarwas tantamountto patriotism,to criticizehim was to commit covertantiStalinism . The point is emphasized by a brief account of Ivan's fate as a historical figure in the decades after Stalin's death. But Ivan became a surrogatethrough a seriesof processesthat had little to do with officialpolicy. Indeed, the original intention of the analogy, especially at the time of the Ezhovshchina, was probably to draw attention to Stalin's cruelty (Stalin himselfappearsto have believed that Ivan had been insufficientlybrutalin his slaughterof potential opponents). It was only in the later 1930s that the image of the cruel Tsar was reappropriatedin the service of modern dictatorship. The results occasionally raised eyebrows even among Stalinist historians. Kostelyev's notion of the 'people's Tsar', for instance, was too sycophantic (and incredible)even forreviewersin the I940s. In all, then, this lively and intelligent study adds to the growing literature that documents the interactionsbetween leadershipand creativeintelligentsia in the shapingof Stalinistdictatorship.Itwillprove usefulto anyone interested in Stalinism,history-writing,or the artsand literatureof the Soviet era. Department ofHistorical Studies CATHERINE MERRIDALE University ofBristol Sword, EdwardRoland. TheDiaryandDespatches ofa Military Attache' inWarsaw I938-I939. Edited by Elizabeth Turnbull and Andrzej Suchcits. Polish Cultural Foundation, London, 2001. I52 pp. Glossary of Personalities. Index. k78.oo(paperback). JUST when we felt that no more can be added to our knowledge and understanding of British foreign policy towards Poland on the eve of the Second WorldWar,a smallvolume of personalpapersonce more remindsus how complex was the picturein I939. Lieutenant-Colonel Roly Swordacted as Britishmilitaryattacheto Warsaw fromJune 1938untilthe German invasionof Polandin September 1939. This REVIEWS 367 was of course the critical period beginning with the German decision to destabilizeCzechoslovakia,the Munich Conference and the Polishoccupation of the Teschen region. In I939 Germany became belligerent towards Poland and finally, unprovoked, attacked in the early hours of I September I939. Sword was well briefed when he came to Poland and as a resultwas able to send back to London reportswhich, as we now know, gave the ForeignOffice all the information it needed in making the ultimate decision to commit Britain to the defence of Poland. In June 1939 he accompanied General Ironside duringhis fact-findingvisit to Warsawand was privyto detailsof the military and financial talksbetween the Poles and the Britishduring the last months of peace. Throughout, in spite of incapacity caused by a duodenal ulcer, he travelled extensively throughout Poland and generally kept himself remarkablywell informedof Poland'sstateof militarypreparedness. What the reader of the present volume will notice is how perceptive were Sword's conclusions. His reports, which the BritishAmbassador Sir Howard Kennard despatched directlyto the ForeignOffice, and which were based on extensive travels through Poland, visits to munitions factories and contacts with the Polish militaryestablishmentand other militaryattaches, invariably concluded with a warning that Poland would not be able to resist singlehandedly a German attack. That is not to suggest that Sword was not impressed with the determination of Poles to defend their freedom, and the economic progresswhich had been made afterthe Munich Conference. The establishment of Central Industrial Zone and extensive investment into the building of ammunition factories...